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3Micro and macro indicators of competition:  
comparison and relation with productivity change 
 
Michael Poldera, Erik Veldhuizen, Dirk van den Bergen and Eugène van der Pijll 
Abstract 
This paper investigates competition in the Dutch manufacturing sector. We look at vari-
ous indicators that have been used throughout the literature and relate these to productiv-
ity growth. Moreover, where possible, the indicators and productivity growth are calcu-
lated at both the firm and industry level. This enables us to investigate differences in 
competition and in its relation with productivity for both aggregation levels. Our results 
indicate that contemporaneous competition is associated with lower productivity, while 
lagged competition is positively associated with productivity. This finding is consistent 
between micro and macro, and robust over the various indicators and industries. The 
results are consistent with the idea that firms first experience negative effects of changes 
in competition and need time to adjust, while in the period after adjustment productivity 
rises again. 
 
Keywords: competition, productivity change, growth accounts, Production Statistics, 
micro-macro 
 
a Correspondending author: jplr@cbs.nl, tel. +31 70 337 5138. 
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61. Introduction 
It is a common belief that competition is good for the performance of firms. This is 
illustrated for example by various recent policy measures by the Dutch government, 
concerning among other things the liberalization of markets and the abolishment of 
barriers to trade (Creusen et al. 2006a). Although there are many arguments to sup-
port the hypothesis that competition stimulates productivity, there are also argu-
ments against it. Moreover, empirical evidence on the effect of competition on pro-
ductivity is limited and ambiguous (OECD, 2008). This study aims to shed new light 
on this issue by investigating the relation between firm performance and competition 
using firm and industry level data, and by looking at a broad range of indicators. 
1.1 What is competition? 
To study the relationship between competition and productivity, it is natural to start 
with defining what we mean by competition. Unfortunately, a clear-cut definition of 
competition is not available from the literature. A possible reason for this is the 
many forms that competition may take. Instead of trying to give a definition, we 
therefore shortly describe a few manifestations of competition, mainly to create 
some intuition of the concept and without the illusion of being exhaustive. This pa-
per focuses on competition in the product market. Thus, when speaking of competi-
tion, we think of firms competing against each other for the demand for their prod-
ucts. This fight can take place in many ways, but the common denominator is that 
firms will try to distinguish themselves from their competitors. Perhaps the most 
obvious example is that firms can compete for demand by lowering their prices. 
They can achieve this by cutting margins, or decreasing production costs. In addi-
tion, it is likely that there is strong competition when the product market is homoge-
neous. That is, if products are very similar, competition is high. Thus, besides lower-
ing prices, a firm may attract demand by means of product differentiation or, for 
instance, by offering complementary services. Another way is to improve on sales 
methods or marketing, for example by offering the possibility to order via internet or 
through increased advertising. In order to increase its competitiveness, a firm may 
also look at possibilities to merge with or acquire competing firms. 
With these examples of competitive behaviour in mind, we think of the degree of 
competition in a particular market as the extent to which firms engage in actions to 
attract demand. The degree of competition may change due to a change in the num-
ber of competitors and/or a change of behaviour of incumbent firms. At the micro-
level, a firm experiences a change in competition when new rivals enter its market or 
when existing rivals exit or adjust their efforts to compete.  
1.2 Competition: good or bad for performance? 
In what way can competition affect firm performance? To start with the arguments 
in favour of a positive effect of competition on performance, the underlying idea is 
roughly that in a competitive market firms are forced to work more efficiently in 
order to make profits and survive. Competition leads to price pressure since it is 
7more difficult to pass on costs to consumers. It therefore exerts a downward pressure 
on profits, which in turn stimulates firms to produce more efficiently through the 
reduction of wastages, slack in input utilization or wage cost (Banker et al. 1996). In 
other words, firms allocate resources in a more efficient way: structural excess ca-
pacity will be reduced and resources will be put to their most productive use 
(Creusen et al. 2006b).1 On the other hand, Nickell (1996) calls this line of reasoning 
‘simplistic’, arguing that under monopolistic competition managers are just as eager 
to raise performance as under other types of competition. Rather, under stronger 
competition, profits are more sensitive to managerial efforts, and managerial efforts 
can be better monitored. In this way competition is good for performance. 
In addition, competition can be an incentive to be innovative: the development of 
new goods and services and/or improvements in the production process are ways for 
firms to get an edge over their competitors. Related to this is the point that in a com-
petitive environment the diffusion of new knowledge is stimulated. By adaption and 
imitation, firms are able to learn from their most successful competitors and there-
fore become more productive.2 In Van der Wiel et al. (2008) it is found that this 
learning process is speeded up when the degree of competition is higher. Similarly, 
international competition (i.e. international trade) may affect productivity in a simi-
lar way, through the diffusion of knowledge (e.g. foreign R&D). 
At the industry level, competitive pressure may also result in better performance due 
to a selection effect: due to competition the least efficient firms are forced out of the 
market. Entry and exit of firms therefore play an important role in increasing indus-
try productivity. Entry of new firms entails higher competition, and also brings new 
technology and knowledge to the market. The less productive, inefficient firms will 
be forced out of the market and the most productive, efficient firms will survive. 
Due to the selection mechanism inherent to these industrial dynamics, the average 
productivity of the market increases.  
Thus, many arguments support the hypothesis that competition is good for both pro-
ductivity and productivity growth. However, there are also reasons why competition 
may not be good. Firstly, due to competition it may be that there is not enough cash 
flow to finance R&D, which in turn deters a firm to be innovative and improve per-
formance in the long run. This line of reasoning goes back to Schumpeter (1942), 
who suggested that competition is detrimental to innovation. Investment in R&D is 
only possible with sufficient financial resources. With respect to internal financing, 
Schumpeter claimed that monopoly is the optimal market form for innovation. 
 
1 An interesting example is that competition may influence productivity through its effect on 
the characteristics of organizational design. Guadalupe and Wulf (2008) found that competi-
tion leads firms to become flatter. This reduces the number of positions between the CEO 
and division managers, and increases the number of positions reporting directly to the CEO, 
indicating that communication becomes more efficient. 
2 On the other hand, if due to competition firms have less opportunity to enjoy competitive 
advantages from their innovation, this may actually deter innovation, which in turn leads to 
lower productivity. See also below. 
8Moreover, external finance may not always be an option (Mohnen et al. 2008). 
Aghion et al. (2005) suggest that the truth about the relation between competition 
and productivity may be somewhere in the middle: they find that moderate competi-
tion stimulates innovation, but if competition is too fierce firms have no scope to be 
innovative. 
Secondly, if potential sales of new products are uncertain due to competition, firms 
may also be hesitant to invest in the development of new products. Under uncertain 
conditions, firms are known to postpone investments (e.g. Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), 
which is also likely to hamper productivity growth. Moreover, firms may enjoy less 
competitive advantage from their innovations due to imitation behavior of their 
competitors. This provides less incentive to be innovative. Finally, competition may 
also involve a battle of incumbent firms to keep entrants out of the market. This 
involves strategic decisions, which are not necessarily optimal in terms of perform-
ance for the incumbent firms. Power (1998) finds no effect of investment on produc-
tivity and argues that this could be due to the fact that the investment decision may 
involve strategic considerations.3 In addition, young and dynamic firms are found to 
be a major source of productivity growth at the aggregate level (e.g. Foster et al. 
2000), which suggests that entry deterrence due to competition is bad in this respect. 
1.3 Relation to the literature and aim of the paper 
All in all, the direction of the effect of competition on productivity is not clear a
priori. One of the main complications in testing the relation between competition 
and performance, is the definition and measurement of competition. This is a diffi-
cult and largely unresolved issue. For example, the intensity of competition is some-
times measured by the number of firms in a market or firms’ market shares. These 
measures can be ambiguous, however, as a market with two or three large firms can 
be as competitive as a market consisting of several hundreds of small firms depend-
ing on how aggressive the behaviour of the firms is. In addition, it is usually not 
clear how the firm’s market is defined. 
In the available literature, competition has been measured with several different 
indicators, each measuring a single aspect of competition. The Herfindahl index, for 
example, measures the concentration of firms within a market, whereas the price 
cost margin (PCM) measures the profitability of firms. Despite its multidimensional 
character, only few studies used multiple indicators of competition. In this paper, we 
use a selection of competition indicators, and discuss their advantages and draw-
backs. To our knowledge, no study has investigated a set of indicators as extended 
as we use in this paper.  
As mentioned above, there is only some empirical evidence on the competition-
productivity link, which is limited to a few countries (mainly US or UK firms), a 
 
3 Thus, relating this to the previous point about firm investment, competition may lead to the 
delay of investment, but also to investment that is not (directly) aimed at fostering the per-
formance of the firm. In both cases, productivity is negatively affected. 
9few industries, or specific periods of time (OECD 2008). Despite its relevance for 
policy, the development of competition in the Netherlands since the early 1990s has 
hardly been investigated at an economy-wide scale (Creusen et al. 2006a). Several 
studies have empirically investigated the relationship between different indicators of 
competition, labour productivity and/or multi-factor productivity (e.g. Nickell, 
1996). Although each of these studies made a valuable contribution, they have some 
limitations with respect to the number of industries studied, the number of indicators 
studied, and the number of observations used to specify the relationships empiri-
cally. In particular, none of the studies that we found investigated the relationship 
between competition and productivity by combining firm-level data and macro-
economic data from the National Accounts. Previous research did however find 
differences between similar indicators that were both measured at the macro level 
and the micro level (Creusen et al. 2006a). 
The aim of this paper is to make a contribution to the empirical literature on the 
measurement of competition and its relation to firm performance. Our analysis has 
an explorative nature. We consider various existing measures of competition and 
their relation with productivity at different levels of aggregation. Both productivity 
and competition indicators are calculated on the basis of firm- and industry-level 
data from respectively the Production Statistics (PS) and the National Accounts 
(NA) covering the period 1995-2005. It is interesting to look at whether the various 
indicators point into the same direction, and whether they suggest the same relation 
of competition to productivity. In particular, for the indicators that can be calculated 
on both micro and macro data, it is interesting to see whether the results are consis-
tent. Finally, the use of micro as well as macro data, offers the possibility to use the 
official multi-factor productivity statistics in the growth accounts of Statistics Neth-
erlands (CBS, 2008), while also exploiting the richness of the available micro data. 
It may be that due to aggregation, some indicators do not correlate with productivity 
at the industry level, while the micro data do allow to identify such a correlation. 
Our study contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. Firstly, as 
mentioned, we use a combination of micro and macro level indicators of competition 
and productivity. This allows us to compare the relationship at two different aggre-
gation levels. Secondly, we use a broad set of competition indicators. This allows us 
to analyse the multiple aspects of competition and their relationships with productiv-
ity. Thirdly, we use KLEMS multi-factor productivity as a dependent variable in-
stead of the more commonly used labour productivity. This allows us to account for 
changes in capital and/or intermediate use, to disentangle a ‘true’ efficiency effect. 
Finally, we analyse the effect of time lags between the competition measures and 
productivity. 
The following research questions will guide the remainder of this study: 
 Which indicators can be used to measure competition at the macro and mi-
cro level? 
 To what extent do similar indicators of competition at the macro and micro 
level lead to similar results and how can differences be explained? 
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 What is the relation between competition and productivity? 
 How does the relationship between competition and productivity vary over 
different measures of competition? 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the competition meas-
ures, and gives a brief overview of the calculation of multi-factor productivity 
change at both the micro and macro level. It also describes the data sources and dis-
cusses particular choices that were made with respect to the calculation of the vari-
ous variables. Section 3 discusses the results for the various competition measures, 
and the results for various regressions of productivity change on the levels and 
changes in the competition measures, employing different timing assumptions. Sec-
tion 4 concludes, summarizes, and gives suggestions for further research. 
2. Measuring competition and productivity 
There are a number of competition indicators that are suggested throughout the lit-
erature. In section 2.1, we review some indicators that are frequently used and that 
will also be used in this paper. In addition, we describe how productivity growth is 
measured in section 2.2. The data are briefly described in section 2.3. Section 2.4 
discusses a couple of problems that arise when using the competition indicators. 
Finally, section 2.5 reviews some empirical research in which these indicators have 
been used. 
2.1 Measures of competition 
2.1.1 Price cost margin 
The price cost margin (PCM, sometimes referred to as the Lerner index) is an indi-
cator for profitability. It reflects a firm’s ability to set its prices above marginal cost. 
As competition increases, firms are forced to reduce their markup, the limit being 
perfect competition where prices equal marginal costs. Strictly speaking, the indica-
tor is defined as the difference between price and marginal costs, but because the 
latter are not observed, it is often operationalised as the difference between produc-
tion-based output and average variable costs (labour input, L and intermediate use, 
which is the sum of energy, material and service costs, E + M + S). A higher PCM is 
indicative of a less competitive market.4 It is calculated as: 
 
4 A problem with the PCM that often goes unnoticed is that a shift to a more capital intensive 
production method (‘capital deepening’) leads to a higher PCM. In this case, it suggests a 
lower level of competition while there has only been a shift in the mix of production factors. 
This can be accounted for by adjusting the profit measure for (exogenous) capital cost (i.e. 
‘clear’ profits). In this paper, however, we use the PCM as it is applied in the literature. Cal-
culations on the macro data show that the PCM based on clear profits is highly correlated 
with the original PCM, and that the regression results are similar when using either defini-
tion. 
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 itPCM  =
it
ititititit
Y
SMELY )( +++
where i and t indicate the firm and year 
 itPCM  price cost margin 
 itY production value (total revenue) 
 itL labour costs  
 itE energy costs 
 itM materials costs 
 itS costs of services 
 
The PCM for an industry j can be calculated in two ways. Firstly, we can use the 
National Accounts variables for industry j to calculate: 
 jtPCM  = 
jt
jtjtjtjtjt
Y
SMELY )( +++
.
Secondly, using the firm-level PCM, we can do a weighted summation to get: 
 

=
ji
ititit
PS
jt PCMmshPCM 
)( ,
where 
 it sampling weight of firm i
mshit the share of firm i in the total value of (unconsolidated) production5
of industry j (i.e. market share) 
Except for the sampling weight, this last measure is also used in Creusen et al. 
(2006a).6 Observations in the micro data where the PCM is larger than one are con-
sidered outliers and are therefore not taken into account.7
5 Consolidation refers to the netting-out of supply and use streams in order to aggregate 
smaller units to a larger single unit. 
6 Small firms are included in the PS according to a stratified sampling. Each firm receives a 
weight that reflects how many firms it represents in the total population. Thus, strictly speak-
ing, these firms should be weighted when aggregating. 
7 Note that if total variable costs (L + E + M + S) and production value (Yjt) are non-negative 
the PCM cannot exceed one by definition. 
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2.1.2 Labour income ratio 
The labour income ratio (LINC) indicates the share of labour income in net value 
added. The idea is that a higher labour-income ratio points to more competition, as 
value added consists to a larger extent of labour costs and profits are lower. This is 
an admittedly rough measure of competition, and is included here mainly as it is a 
frequently used economic yardstick in policy (see Creusen et al. 2006a).8 The labour 
income ratio for firm i is calculated as: 
 itLINC =
it
it
NVA
L
where 
 itLINC  labour income ratio 
itNVA  net value added (i.e. NVAit = VAit  Dit = Yit  (Eit + Mit + Sit)
 Dit, where VAit is value added and Dit is depreciation) 
Similarly, for industry j, LINCjt is calculated as 
 jtLINC =
jt
jt
NVA
L
From the micro data we can also calculate 
 



=
ji itit
ji ititPS
jt NVA
L
LINC

)( .
Again this last measure is similar to that used in Creusen et al. (2006a). Observa-
tions where the labour costs exceed the production value are not taken into account.  
2.1.3 Import quote 
The import quote indicates the contribution of foreign firms to competition in a do-
mestic market. Due to strong foreign competition on their output market, companies 
are forced to work more efficiently. This results in a higher productivity. The import 
quote is measured at the commodity level. It reflects the share of imports of a certain 
product in the total (domestic) use of that commodity.9 A higher import quote means 
 
8 One drawback of the LINC is that a high value may also reflect the bargaining power of 
employees in a certain industry. In addition, the inverse of the LINC is related to (the inverse 
of) labour productivity. If an increase in competition forces firms to work more efficiently, 
labour productivity is expected to rise. Since the LINC is inversely related to labour produc-
tivity it will fall, which – following the line of argument above – wrongly suggests a fall in 
competition. 
9 Commodities are measured at the lowest available aggregation level of the Supply and Use 
tables (104 commodity groups of which the main producing industry is part of the manufac-
turing industry). 
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that there is more competition from foreign firms on the domestic market. To calcu-
late the import quote per industry, we assign total imports and total domestic use of 
a product to the main producing industry. Furthermore, adjustments for imported 
goods that are directly re-exported are made. The import quote is calculated as: 
 jtIMPQ = 

c ctjc
c ctjc
DU
IMP


where, 
 ctIMP  imports net of transit for commodity c
jc 1 if j is main producing industry of commodity c
0 otherwise 
 ctDU  domestic use of commodity c in year t
This indicator has been used before in CBS (2008). There is no similar indicator 
available at the firm-level from the PS, since the import quote is by definition a 
macro indicator.  
2.1.4 Export quote 
The export quote measures for what part of sales companies rely on foreign markets, 
and is therefore an indicator for the exposure to competition on foreign markets. It is 
calculated as the share of total domestic production that is produced for foreign mar-
kets. A higher export quote means that firms are for a larger part of their sales ex-
posed to competition on foreign markets. This competition indicator is different 
from all other indicators, since all other indicators measure competition on domestic 
markets.  
Similar to the import quote, the macro export quote is measured at the commodity 
level. In this case, the total exports and production of a commodity are assigned to 
the main producing industry. Again exports are net of transit goods. The export 
quote is then calculated as: 
 

=
c ctjc
c ctjc
jt Y
EXP
EXPQ


,
where 
 jc = 1 if j is the main producing industry of commodity c
= 0 otherwise 
 ctEXP  export value of commodity c
Yct total domestic production value of commodity c
At the micro level, we observe how much a firm exports. It is not possible to follow 
exactly the definition of the macro-indicator, however, since we do not have a break-
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breakdown by commodity type. As a firm-level indicator of exposure to competition 
on foreign markets, we use the share of exports in total sales by a firm:10 
it
it
it S
EXPEXPQ =
where EXPit total value of exports 
 Sit total sales value 
An industry indicator for EXPQ from the micro data follows from a weighted sum-
mation of the numerator and denominator  
 



=
ji itit
ji ititPS
jt S
EXP
EXPQ


.
Note that the weighted micro data indicator is in this case conceptually different 
from the indicator based on macro data, since the latter is based on export data per 
commodity group and assigns a main producing industry to each commodity. In 
practice, however, the macro export quote hardly changes when it is calculated ac-
cording to the “micro definition”. 
2.1.5 Profit elasticity 
The profit elasticity (PE), or relative profits measure, introduced by Boone (2000), 
describes the relation between a firm’s profit and its marginal costs. It is calculated 
as the percentage change in profits due to a 1 percent change in marginal costs (i.e. 
the elasticity of profit with respect to marginal costs). The main idea of the indicator 
is that fiercer competition enables efficient firms to earn relatively higher profits 
than less efficient competitors. Thus, in a highly competitive market the elasticity of 
profit with respect to costs will be higher. Boone (2000) emphasizes that comparison 
of the indicator over industries is hampered due to the fact that marginal costs are 
unobserved and that it is difficult to define the relevant market.11,12 However, it can 
be argued that the bias in the indicator does not change too much over time within 
 
10 We normalize on total sales instead of total production value as exports refer explicitly to 
sales abroad. Among other things, sales do not include changes in the stock of commodities. 
This ensures that the export quote is smaller than 1. Note that this is a difference with the 
macro-definition. At the industry-level, however, changes in inventories are usually small 
relative to production since positive and negative changes at the micro-level cancel out. 
11 In addition, Boone mentions the problem of an ‘unlevel playing field’ within a market. 
That is, market conditions may not be equal for different firms, for example due to tax ex-
emptions. Failing to account for this, distorts the interpretation of the profit elasticity as a 
competition measure. 
12 Since the estimation of the profit elasticity in principle does not require observations on all 
firms in the market, the problem of the definition of a market can be mitigated if there is a 
sample of firms available for which it is clear that they belong to the same market. 
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an industry, so that comparing the elasticities over time provides an indication of the 
development of competition. 
The PE can only be calculated on micro data. It can be calculated for different indus-
tries and years separately. Following Boone et al. (2007), the profit elasticity is cal-
culated as the t in the regression 
 ln(Yit  VCit) = tln(MCit) + i + 	t + uit for i  j
where 
 VCit = Lit + Eit + Mit + Sit variable costs 
 MCit marginal costs 
 i firm fixed effect 
 	t year dummy 
 uit (idiosyncratic) disturbance 
 
This regression is carried out for each industry j and year t separately. Thus, the PE 
is industry and year specific. Because marginal costs are unobserved, average costs 
are used as a proxy, following e.g. Boone et al. (2007). Thus, MCit 
 (VCit/Yit). To 
control for firm-specific effects, the equation is estimated by Fixed Effects (FE).13 
2.1.6 Herfindahl concentration index 
The Herfindahl concentration index, or Herfindahl index for short, indicates the 
number and size of firms in a sector. It is defined as the sum of squared market 
shares. A market with one single firm has a Herfindahl index of 1, while a Herfin-
dahl index close to 0 means that there is a large number of firms with a low market 
share. A decreasing Herfindahl index means that the concentration in a market is 
reduced and, since it is inversely related to competition, this is interpreted as a rise in 
competition. The Herfindahl can only be calculated on the basis of micro data and is 
given by: 
 

=
ji
ititjt mshHERF
2 .
13 Basic outlier detection is followed in this estimation: we only use records based on actual 
response to the PS survey (i.e. imputations are excluded), and drop the lowest and highest 
percentile in a Cobb-Douglas production function estimation as well as those records for 
which this estimation cannot be done due to missing values or non-positive in- or output. 
Time-effects are controlled for by year dummies. 
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2.1.7 C4 
The C4 indicator is a measure similar to the Herfindahl index, and reflects the ag-
gregate market share of the four firms with the largest market shares. Similar meas-
ures, such as C5 and C10, are also commonly used. It is given by 
 

=
jCi
itjt mshC4
where Cj is the group of four firms with the largest market share in industry j. If the 
market shares of the largest firms increase, this is evidence for further concentration 
of the market, and hence a fall in the level of competition. 
2.2 Productivity measurement 
For productivity measurement, the KLEMS–Y model is used. For any entity i (either 
a firm or an industry) this can be written as 
 ititt
S
it
S
ti
M
it
M
it
E
it
E
it
L
it
L
it
K
it
K
it ypxwxwxwxwxw =+++++
where 
 kitw the unit cost of input k, k  {K, L, E, M, S}
k
itx the quantity of input k
it
K
it
K
it Kxw = the user cost of capital 
 it
L
it
L
it Lxw = , it
E
it
E
it Exw = , it
M
it
M
it Mxw = , it
S
it
S
it Sxw =
total costs of factor k
itp the output price  
 ity the output quantity 
 ititit Yyp = value of total output  
 t clear profits (i.e. profits net of user cost of capital) 
 
In the calculations of the user cost of capital at the macro level, an exogenous inter-
est rate is used. Therefore total costs do not equal total revenue. This gives rise to 
clear profits on all aggregation levels. An exogenous interest rate is chosen so that 
we do not have to use neoclassical assumptions in our productivity measurements. 
More detailed information on measuring productivity without neoclassical assump-
tions is given by Balk (2008). At the micro level there is no information available on 
the costs of capital, which are therefore proxied by the sum of depreciation and 
rental payments. 
Dropping the subscript i for notational convenience, productivity change is calcu-
lated as (unless stated otherwise, changes always refer to from year t1 on year t)
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 1, ttIMFP  the index of multi-factor productivity (mfp)
Y
ttQ 1,  the volume index of the output  
 XttQ 1,  the volume index of the inputs 
 
Volume changes are calculated with a Laspeyres index, that is both the quantities in 
year t and t1 are weighted by prices of t1. The volume index of the inputs is there-
fore calculated as 
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1, ,
and similarly for output Y.
2.2.1 Productivity measurement at the macro level 
At the macro level, productivity measurement is based completely on the Dutch 
national accounts. For this purpose, the manufacturing industry is divided into 13 
separate industries. Annex 1 provides a list of these industries. 
A thorough overview of the methods used to calculate productivity change at the 
macro level is given by Van den Bergen et al. (2007). A few characteristics are: 
 Sectoral output is used for the calculations. Consolidation is based on square 
industry by industry input-output tables constructed for each commodity dis-
tinguished in the Dutch supply-use system. 
 It is assumed that self-employed have the same yearly labour income as em-
ployees.  
 The nominal interest rate used in the calculation of the user cost of capital is 
based on the average interest rate that companies must pay on outstanding 
bonds. It is estimated as the internal reference rate (IRR) between Dutch 
banks plus a surcharge of 1.5 percent. 
2.2.2 Productivity measurement at the micro level 
The calculation at the micro level follows that at the macro level as closely as possi-
ble, see Annex 6 for details on the calculation of each of the variables. Due to the 
lack of data, however, we use depreciation and rental payments data to proxy for the 
user cost of capital. Price indices are drawn from the supply and use tables.  
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2.3 Data 
Data at the macro level were obtained from the National Accounts (NA). The avail-
ability of time-series on productivity statistics and the restriction to use only final 
year data limits our dataset to the years 1995 to 2005. Micro data come from the 
Production Statistics (PS). Data for the industry ‘manufacture of petroleum prod-
ucts’ were not considered, since there are very few firms in this industry (less than 
30) and the micro data proved to be too volatile with respect to the macro data in this 
industry. This means that we distinguish in total 12 industries, in accordance to the 
publication level of the Dutch growth accounts. 
The analysis was limited to manufacturing industries for several reasons. Firstly, it is 
not possible to calculate the competitition indicators and/or mfp growth for various 
industries in the service sector, due to the lack of micro data. In addition, despite 
promising developments at the macro-level for a selection of industries, price and 
volume measures are in general not as well established in the service sector as in 
manufacturing. Finally, and only with respect to the degree of international competi-
tion, it can be expected that the impact of exports and imports is far less an issue in 
services than in manufacturing. 
2.4 Issues with measuring competition 
The existing literature suggests some problems with conventional measures of com-
petition. We review some of them in this paragraph and add some reservations of 
our own.  
2.4.1 What is the firm’s market? 
Competition is usually regarded as a market phenomenon, and therefore competition 
measures often refer to a ‘market’, which is usually equated to an industry. How-
ever, it is generally hard to say what exactly the firm’s market is. An industry can be 
quite heterogeneous with respect to its products, even at low levels of aggregation. 
Also, when firms are very diversified they may be active in various markets and 
experience different degrees of competition in different markets, while they are clas-
sified in a single industry. In addition, there is usually no information on the spatial 
dimension of competition. For example, retailers may be classified in the same in-
dustry but can be monopolists on their local markets, while similar firms need to 
deal with a competitor across the street. In addition, because of globalisation, firms 
are more and more internationally active. This means that firms experience competi-
tion from foreign firms, in the domestic as well as foreign markets. Due to the rise of 
internet sales, it is not even necessary for a firm to be physically present abroad to be 
internationally active (or, vice versa, a competitor does not need to be physically 
present in a firm’s country). The international dimension of competition is typically 
hard to measure, however, because survey based data is usually confined to the na-
tional activities of domestic firms.  
The upshot of the preceding is that there can be a difference between the degree of 
competition in a market or industry with the degree of competition experienced by 
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the firm. In this paper, we will use industry-level as well as firm-level indicators, the 
latter (based for example on a firm’s profit) being independent from the definition of 
a firm’s market. 
2.4.2 Selection, reallocation, mergers and acquisitions 
Most indicators focus on a particular aspect of competition. For example, the Her-
findahl index and other measures are based on market shares. These measures pick 
up the change of entry barriers over time relatively well, but if competition intensi-
fies due to more aggressive conduct of firms, they point into the wrong direction. To 
see this, note that the increase in competition forces the least efficient firms out of 
the market. This increases market shares, so that concentration indices actually point 
to less competition. Thus, they fail to pick up a selection effect. 
Related to this point, an increase in competition can lead to a reallocation effect, in 
the sense that market shares of efficient firms (in terms of marginal costs of produc-
tion) are raised relative to those of inefficient firms. Concentration increases in this 
case, so that concentration indices point to less competition in these instances. 
Boone et al. (2007) argue that such reallocation effects also distort the (industry 
level) PCM indicator. That is, an increase in competition raises the market share of 
efficient firms with a high PCM. If the more efficient firms are also more profitable, 
this means that the industry PCM may in fact increase, suggesting a fall in competi-
tion. Boone et al. identify the reallocation effect in the PS data for 1993 to 2002. 
They find that the PCM tends to misrepresent the development of competition over 
time in markets with few firms and high concentration. Note that the reallocation 
effect does not play a role for the firm level definition of the PCM, since it does not 
depend on the firm’s market. The PE is also claimed not to have these disadvan-
tages, as increasing competition always leads to increased profits of efficient firms 
to the adverse of less efficient firms (Boone, 2000). 
Finally, competition may manifest itself in the threat of being taken over or the need 
to merge with other companies to become a more competitive market player. Indus-
tries that are characterized by this type of competition include for example the air-
line industry and financial industries, as well as the energy sector. Clearly, concen-
tration indices are less suitable to describe competition in a market that is character-
ized by mergers and acquisitions. 
2.4.3 Endogeneity 
The indicators discussed above are all based on variables which are thought to be 
(inversely) related to competition: profitability, market share, export and import. The 
problem that arises when relating these indicators to firm performance, is that the 
underlying variables are not determined completely independently from the per-
formance measure. Firms may be more profitable if they are more productive, higher 
productivity may lead to a higher market share, better performing firms may have a 
higher chance to be active on the international market. In addition, both the PCM 
and LINC implicitly refer to the value component of profitability, whereas produc-
tivity is the volume component of profitability. The fact that the underlying vari-
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ables are not independent from (changes in) productivity, makes the competition 
indicators endogenous to productivity. In fact, the examples suggest that in this case 
there is a negative relationship between productivity and competition. 
To account for this, we also use lagged values next to contemporaneous values for 
the competition indicators (cf. Van der Wiel et al. 2008). Because the level of com-
petition in year t1 is not jointly determined with productivity in year t, and produc-
tivity changes in year t do not cause changes in competition in year t1, it can be 
argued that the lagged values are exogenous. Besides accounting for endogeneity, 
this specification reflects that there may be a lagged effect of competition on produc-
tivity. As companies become less profitable due to competition in one year, they will 
change business processes and become more productive. It may take time, however, 
for firms to adjust to changes in competition, especially if production structures are 
inflexible. Therefore, changes in competition need time to effectuate and increase 
productivity.14
2.4.4 Micro-macro inconsistencies 
Another problem is that data sources on which competition measures can be calcu-
lated may lead to differing results. In their study on measuring competion in the 
Netherlands, Creusen et al. (2006a) compared the PE, PCM, LINC, and the Herfin-
dahl, using data from the PS (PE, PCM, Herfindahl) and NA (LINC, PCM). Most 
indicators point to a decline of competition in the Netherlands in the period 1993-
2001. In particular, all indicators derived from firm-level data and the LINC indicate 
such a decline. The NA version of the PCM, however, points to a rise in competition 
and therefore disagrees with the firm-level PCM. According to the authors, this find-
ing could reflect that NA data come from various aggregated micro sources which 
are integrated to get a consistent picture of the Dutch economy. In Annex 2b it can 
be seen, however, that for most industries the PCM based on the NA data follows 
that based on the PS quite closely. The reason for the differing results with Creusen 
et al. could lie in the fact that a slightly different time frame is used here. Indeed, the 
similarity seems to have improved after 2001, which is the last year of the CPB 
study. In addition, the correspondence between micro and macro results may also 
benefit from the use of sampling weights and exclusion of outliers as we have done 
here. 
 
14 Alternatively, if productivity in year t is believed to be affected by competition in year t, a
possibility to account for the endogeneity issue is to use the lagged competition variables as 
instruments for the current values (for example by using an Instrument Variables estimation 
method like Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) or the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM)). We will not pursue this in this report; unreported results for 2SLS, however, show 
that the results do not differ much from those with the lagged variables. This is not surpris-
ing, because in that case the competition indicator is replaced by a prediction based on its 
lag. 
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2.4.5 Caveat to the profit elasticity 
The PE is a relatively new measure of competition and has not been used frequently 
in empirical research. Although the indicator has a sound theoretical founding, a few 
question marks are in place regarding its empirical application. In particular, the PE 
is defined as the sensitivity of profits to marginal costs. Because marginal costs are 
not observed, these are replaced by average costs. Thus, the estimating equation is 
 ln(Yit  VCit) = tln(VCit/Yit) + i + 	t + uit for i  j
In fact, this estimation relates profits to (the inverse of) profitability. But if profit-
ability goes up, profits go up by definition. It is therefore doubtful whether this ap-
proach is suitable to estimate the sensitivity of profits to efficiency.
This point is left for further investigation. We shall estimate the profit elasticity as it 
is used in the current literature. 
2.5 Some results of previous research 
Several studies have investigated the relationships between different indicators of 
competition and productivity. Most of them pointed to a positive effect of product 
market competition on productivity growth. In this section we discuss the results of 
a few studies in this area to be able to relate our own results to those in the literature. 
Nickell (1996) investigated the relation between productivity and competition, using 
the following competition measures: market share, the Herfindahl index, import 
penetration, average rents, and a survey based measure on the number of competi-
tors (“Have you more than five competitors in the market for your products?”). The 
average rents measure was calculated as an average over the sample period of profits 
less capital costs (i.e. ‘clear’ profits), as a percentage of value added. Endogeneity 
was controlled for by using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation. 
Data from a panel of UK firms over the period 1972-1986 showed a weak effect of 
competition on multi-factor productivity levels, but a stronger effect on productivity 
growth. The strongest effect was observed for the rents indicator.  
Two studies performed an analysis in the spirit of Nickell (1996) for the Nether-
lands. Felsö et al. (2001) used data for the manufacturing, construction, and trade 
sectors for the period 1985-1996. Productivity growth showed a significant correla-
tion with the competition measures used: the profit elasticity, the Herfindahl index, 
market share, and average firm size. Lever and Nieuwenhuijsen (1998) focussed on 
the Dutch manufacturing sector. They found that the increase of concentration in 
markets (in terms of higher market shares) leads to lower levels of productivity. 
Industries with relatively lower levels of market concentration, higher export shares 
and higher import shares show more than average growth of productivity. The au-
thors further conclude that profitability has a positive and significant effect on pro-
ductivity. According to the authors, this finding supports the so-called Schumpeter’s 
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Mark II hypothesis that monopoly profits are necessary for investments in research 
and development and innovation.15 
With respect to the development of competition, Lever and Nieuwenhuijsen found 
that competition in Dutch manufacturing increased in the period 1978-1993. For the 
retail sector, Creusen et al. (2006b) used the PE to evaluate changes in competition. 
It was shown that on average, the competition in this sector decreased in the time 
period 1993-2002. However, for some parts of this sector, an increase in competition 
was observed. Linking the data with the innovation surveys, it was shown that there 
was a positive and linear relationship between innovation and competition. The re-
port concluded that stimulating competition is conducive for innovation. Both com-
petition and innovation were shown to have a positive correlation with multi-factor 
productivity. Creusen et al. (2006a) found that competition at the level of the market 
sector in the Netherlands declined in the period 1993-2001. Competition was meas-
ured with the PCM and PE. It was found that competition did not increase for most 
industries. In fact, a considerable number of industries experienced a sharp rise or 
strong fall in competition. As discussed in Boone et al. (2007), Creusen et al. 
(2006a) found that the PCM and PE can lead to contradicting results if reallocation 
effects within an industry are substantial. After estimating a model relating competi-
tion to a number of explanatory variables at the industry level the authors found that 
regulatory reforms have probably intensified competition, but also that considerable 
growth of demand has weakened competition in the period 1993-2001. 
3. Results 
3.1 Summary statistics 
Annex 2 and 3 provide an overview of the development of competition indicators 
and mfp change in 12 Dutch manufacturing industries in the period 1995-2005 (ex-
cluding the manufacture of petroleum products). The similarity between macro indi-
cators and their micro equivalents is reasonably good. Divergence between macro 
and micro indicators can be attributed to such things as aberrant or incorrect obser-
vations of individual firms in the micro data and the use of various sources in the 
macro data.  
The figures in annex 2 and 3 clearly show that it is nearly impossible to draw a sin-
gle conclusion on the development of competition for all manufacturing industries in 
the period 1995-2005. There are large differences in the development of competition 
indicators between industries. For example, some industries, such as the manufac-
ture of basic metals or the manufacture of electrical and optical equipment, show 
more erratic developments than others. Moreover, different indicators sometimes 
point into different directions. According to some indicators, competition increases, 
 
15 However, this finding may also be caused by reversed causality. Profitability may itself be 
influenced by productivity, see also section 2.4.3. 
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whereas other indicators point to a decline in competition. For example, the C4 and 
Herfindahl index show a peak in 1999 for almost all manufacturing industries, indi-
cating a decreased level of competition afterwards. At the same time, the PCM and 
the LINC indicate increased levels of competition in the manufacture of basic metals 
and the manufacture of machinery and equipment.     
Table 1 shows the correlations between macro mfp change and different indicators 
of competition based on industry data in Dutch manufacturing. The first six indica-
tors are based on micro data and the last four indicators are based on macro data. 
The significance of correlations between indicators of competition may be inflated 
as all individual years are used in the analysis and the levels of competition indica-
tors within industries do not vary much between years.  
The correlation coefficients (r) between similar indicators based on micro data and 
macro data (LINC, PCM and export quote) are relatively high (r = .73, r = .64, and r
= .91, respectively). This demonstrates that the correspondence between variables 
that have been aggregated from the micro data and variables that have been calcu-
lated based on macro data is indeed reasonably good. The correlation between the 
LINC and PCM is negative in all cases. This makes sense since the LINC is in-
versely related to the PCM. Naturally, since both indicators are based on market 
shares, the Herfindahl and C4 indices are highly correlated. It is striking that the 
import and export quotes show high correlations with most of the other indicators. 
They are for example positively associated with more concentrated markets (positive 
correlation with Herfindahl and C4) and negatively associated with less profitable 
markets (negative correlation with PCM). Finally, it should be noted that the PE 
only has a moderate (but significant) positive correlation with the LINC, but not 
with the other indicators. 
The upper panel of table 2 shows the correlations among the firm-level indicators. 
Only the Herfindahl and C4 show a very strong correlation again. The PCM and 
LINC show a significant and negative correlation again, but it is more moderate than 
in the macro case. The low correlations are an indication that the indicators measure 
different dimensions of competition. Alternatively, there are situations where some 
indicators may point into the wrong direction (Boone et al. 2007).16 It is somewhat 
striking that the correlations of the PE with the micro-level indicators are significant, 
whereas there is no correlation with the macro counterparts in table 1. These correla-
tions are very moderate however. 
 
16 Differences between table 1 and table 2 for the micro indicators that only vary by industry 
(PE, C4 and Herfindahl) arise for two reasons. Firstly, table 2 calculates the correlations at 
the firm level without industry weights. Thus, industries with more firms get more weight in 
table 2. Secondly, as mentioned in the table note, outliers and imputations are excluded from 
the micro data while we did use these to calculate the aggregates from the micro data. 
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Table 1. Correlation matrix macro and aggregated micro competition measures.
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Herfindahl –.08 .94 1
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Export quote –.04 .64 .59 –.01 –.32 1
Labour income –.01 .22 .39 .73 –.38 .09 1
Price cost margin –.05 –.33 –.41 –.57 .64 –.40 –.80 1
Export quote .02 .61 .50 –.06 –.36 .91 –.02 –.34 1
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Import quote –.04 .57 .52 .26 –.44 .76 .27 –.49 .86 1
Correlations that are significant at the 5% level are bold faced.
25 
Table 2. Correlation matrix micro and macro competition measures. 
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Correlations that are significant at the 5% level are bold faced. Potential outliers were ex-
cluded from the micro data; see also section 3.2.2. Nb. table 2 differs from table 1 in that 
competition measures based on microdata are not aggregated (i.e. correlations are at the firm-
level). 
 
The bottom panel of the table gives the correlations for the micro indicators with 
their National Accounts counterparts. In this case, only the export based indicators 
show a substantial correlation. This is an indication that there is great heterogeneity 
at the micro level for the PCM and LINC, so that the value for the industry is not 
representative for the individual firms. For example, the competition indicators are 
likely to be determined by the larger firms, which may not be representative for the 
degree of competition experienced by a smaller firm. 
3.2 Relation between productivity and competition indicators 
Since we use both micro and macro data, we can relate productivity growth and 
competition indicators at different levels of aggregation. In section 3.2.1, industry-
level productivity growth is related to industry-level competition indicators calcu-
lated from the macro as well as from the micro data. In section 3.2.2, firm level pro-
ductivity growth is related to firm-level competition indicators, as well as to indus-
try-level competition indicators calculated from the macro data. 
3.2.1 Macro productivity 
Table 3 shows the results of our regression analyses of mfp change at the macro 
level on indicators of competition at the macro level, the latter calculated from 
macro as well as from micro data. A simple linear regression model is estimated for 
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each relationship. We use industry and year dummy variables to control for industry- 
and year specific effects. The analyses are conducted for both the levels and the 
changes of the competition indicators, employing different timing assumptions. The 
contemporaneous models refer to the relationships between mfp change in year t and 
competition indicators in year t. In the 1-year lagged models we analyze the rela-
tionships between mfp change in year t and indicators of competition in year t1. 
Table 3 shows the expected signs of the relationships, the estimated regression coef-
ficients, and standard errors. 
Several interesting results of the macro level mfp analyses are described below.  
Firstly, we find that the regression analyses for similar micro and macro indicators 
of competition (i.e., LINC, PCM and export quote) lead to similar results. For ex-
ample, in the contemporaneous model the LINC is negatively and significantly re-
lated to mfp change, both when the LINC is calculated on macro data and when it is 
calculated on micro data. This finding shows that despite some moderate differences 
between similar indicators based on both data sources, the overall relationship be-
tween these micro and macro level indicators and productivity change is the same. 
Secondly, all signs of the significant results in the contemporaneous models are op-
posite to the expected sign when one assumes that competition fosters productivity 
growth. Both the level and the changes of several aspects of competition in year t are 
negatively related to mfp change in year t. A possible conclusion could be that com-
petition is in fact bad for productivity growth. However, as discussed in section 
2.4.3, a possible problem with the contemporaneous indicators is that they are en-
dogenous. We therefore also relate productivity to the lagged competition indicators. 
Modelling a time-lag between the indicators of competition and mfp change ac-
knowledges that it takes time before the effects of competition are realized and re-
duces the problem of endogeneity. The results of the lagged models in table 3 show 
that the signs of the relationships between mfp change, the LINC and the PCM have 
the expected directions both at the micro and the macro level. Compared to the con-
temporaneous models the signs of these relationships are reversed. In a similar way, 
the signs of the relationships in the lagged models for the profit elasticity, macro 
export and macro import quote have switched into the hypothesized directions, but 
they remain insignificant. These results are consistent with the idea that firms need 
time to adjust to changes in competition. First they need time to make adjustments in 
the production process which initially has a disruptive effect. In later periods, this 
results into productivity gains. 
Finally, and contrary to prior expectations, the C4 and Herfindahl index are posi-
tively related to mfp change in both the contemporaneous and lagged models. A 
potential explanation for this result is that the C4 and Herfindahl index can, as dis-
cussed in section 2.4.2, easily be influenced by selection and reallocation effects. 
This means that if competition changes due to the aggressive conduct of firms, con-
centration indicators such as C4 and the Herfindahl index may point into the wrong 
direction. Consequently, the signs of the relationship between these indicators and 
mfp change will then be in the wrong direction too. 
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Table 3. Relationships between macro mfp change and indicators of competition.  
contemporaneous 1-year lagged 
Indicator  expected signa coeff.  s.e. coeff.  s.e. 
Based on micro data   
Profit elasticity  + –0.22 0.26 0.06 0.32 
Profit elasticity (change) + –0.17 0.19 0.20 0.21 
C4  – 16.45** 7.25 11.36 8.68 
C4 (change) – 0.10 0.08 0.02 0.09 
Herfindahl  – 23.63** 9.66 15.05 11.86 
Herfindahl (change) – 21.98* 13.09 46.52*** 13.22 
Labour income  + –8.22** 3.52 10.41** 4.48 
Labour income (change) + –0.12*** 0.03 –0.02 0.03 
Price cost margin  – 24.82** 11.67 –35.70** 13.86 
Price cost margin (change) – 0.42*** 0.10 0.05 0.12 
Export quote  + 3.33 3.72 2.87 4.24 
Export quote (change) + 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Based on macro data   
Labour income  + –4.90*** 1.83 6.71*** 1.99 
Labour income (change)  + –0.14*** 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Price cost margin  – 19.95** 9.17 –41.71*** 9.59 
Price cost margin (change) – 0.46*** 0.07 –0.14 0.09 
Export quote  + –3.69 5.84 0.92 6.62 
Export quote (change) + –0.09 0.07 –0.03 0.08 
Import quote  + –3.59 7.08 8.58 7.92 
Import quote (change)  + –0.17** 0.09 0.03 0.10 
a This is the expected sign according to the hypothesis that more competition leads to a 
higher productivity. Thus, if a higher value of an indicator indicates stronger competition 
(e.g. in case of the PCM), the expected sign is positive. Likewise, if a lower value of an indi-
cator indicates stronger competition (e.g. in the case of the Herfindahl index) the expected 
sign is negative. 
Significance levels: * = .10, **  = .05, ***  = .01. 
 
3.2.2 Micro productivity 
To avoid a distortion of the regression results due to influential data points, we ex-
clude some potential outliers in advance. First of all, we exclude firms with mfp 
levels smaller or equal to zero, and those with an absolute mfp growth of more than 
400%. In addition, we estimate a simple loglinear version of the Cobb-Douglas 
function of gross output on the KLEMS production factors and exclude the observa-
tions associated with the lowest and highest percentile of the residuals of this regres-
sion. This procedure for the exclusion of outliers avoids the inclusion of firms with 
an atypical production structure. Also, the observations for which the production 
function could not be estimated are ruled out. The latter selection drops records with 
either missing observations for input or output variables or (because of the log trans-
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formation) for which they are non-positive. Finally, we only use observations that 
are based on actual response by firms (i.e. quality flag ‘A’, thus excluding imputa-
tions and corrections made for statistical purposes).17
Table 4 gives the results for the OLS regression of firm-level productivity on the 
various competition measures. The results are again reported separately for the indi-
cators based on firm-data and those that are calculated on the macro data. In annex 
4, results are reported for the regressions by industry (naturally only for those indi-
cators that vary by firm). The main conclusion from the regressions by industry is 
that, although there is some variation in the magnitudes of the coefficients, there is 
not much heterogeneity among industries. Signs and significance are almost always 
the same. 
 Results for micro data indicators 
In line with the macro results, what is striking about the contemporaneous effects of 
the indicators calculated on micro data is that most signs are opposite to what is 
expected, the only exception being the Herfindahl index. Looking at the results for 
the lagged variables in the right panel of table 4, we see that – again in accordance to 
the macro-regressions – almost all signs of the competition indicators are reversed 
with respect to the contemporaneous effects. Thus, all signs are in line with the ex-
pected sign according to the hypothesis that competition improves productivity (the 
exception being the C4 indicator, which is the only one for which the level as well 
as the difference has an insignificant effect). The Herfindahl index remains to have 
the correct sign. This is somewhat surprising since the Herfindahl index had an un-
expected positive contemporaneous effect in the macro regressions, and was the 
only indicator not to change sign when using the lags. Thus, this result is one of the 
few instances where we find contradicting micro and macro results. 
The fact that we find a positive effect of lagged competition on productivity, as well 
as a reversal of signs when using lags, for such various indicators, shows that the 
effect is quite robust. In addition, most findings are consistent between both the mi-
cro and macro regressions. In some cases, like for the PE, we find significant effects 
in the micro regressions but not for macro. This may be due to the fact that industry 
data hides a lot of heterogeneity at the firm level, which possibly deters the identifi-
cation of an effect at the macro level. This shows the value of using micro data to 
explain macro phenomena. 
 
17 Some additional restrictions are made for the regressions with respect the PCM and the 
LINC. For the PCM, we also exclude observations where the PCM is larger than 1. For the 
LINC we exclude observations with labour costs higher than the production value, or when 
the LINC is larger than 4 in absolute value. (These observations are also excluded from the 
aggregated competition indicators based on micro data.) 
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Table 4. Relationships between micro mfp-change and indicators of competition. 
 contemporaneous 1-year lagged 
Indicator  expected signa coeff.
 s.e. coeff.  s.e.
Based on microdata   
Profit elasticity  + –0.37*** (0.11) 0.54*** (0.11)
Profit elasticity (change) + –0.46*** (0.08) 0.25*** (0.09)
C4  – 0.34 (2.44) –2.85 (2.47)
C4 (change) – 4.09 (2.66) –2.21 (2.83)
Herfindahl  – –11.15*** (3.75) –8.57* (4.37)
Herfindahl (change) – –8.28 (5.10) –16.57*** (5.36)
Labour income + –6.60*** (0.14) 0.09*** (0.01)
Labour income (change) + –0.14*** (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Price cost margin  – 30.02*** (0.52) –24.52*** (0.48)
Price cost margin (change) – 115.61*** (0.35) –31.27*** (0.82)
Export quote  + –0.23 (0.18) 0.03 (0.18)
Export quote (change) + –0.47 (0.35) 1.23*** (0.38)
Based on macrodata   
Labour income + 3.27*** (0.76) 0.86 (0.73)
Labour income (change) + 1.65*** (0.64) –0.82 (0.67)
Price cost margin  – –21.41*** (3.77) –0.75 (3.70)
Price cost margin (change) – –22.00*** (3.89) 8.97** (4.09)
Export quote  + 1.32 (2.28) 4.74** (2.00)
Export quote (change) + –6.45** (2.58) –0.43 (2.67)
Import quote  + 1.20 (2.52) 4.90** (2.24)
Import quote (change)  + –6.04** (2.73) –1.51 (2.88)
a This is the expected sign according to the hypothesis that more competition leads to a 
higher productivity. Thus, if a higher value of an indicator indicates stronger competition 
(e.g. in case of the PCM), the expected sign is positive. Likewise, if a lower value of an indi-
cator indicates stronger competition (e.g. in the case of the Herfindahl) the expected sign is 
negative. 
Significance levels: * = .10, **  = .05, ***  = .01. 
 
 Results for the macro data indicators 
The results for the regression of micro mfp-growth on the macro-indicators of com-
petition are reported in the bottom panel of table 4. The most remarkable result from 
these regressions is that, contrary to the macro-macro and micro-micro results, the 
contemporaneous effects for the LINC as well as the PCM have the expected sign. 
This finding holds also true when the aggregated micro data indicators are used (see 
table A5.1). The fact that these results are different from those from the regressions 
on the micro-counterparts of these indicators, is in line with the low correlation be-
tween the indicators at both aggregation levels given in table 2. This is an indication 
that due to heterogeneity at the firm-level, the industry-level indicators are not repre-
sentative for the degree of competition a firm experiences. Indeed, the export quotes 
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based on both the micro and macro data have a stronger correlation, and we see that 
this indicator does have the same sign as in the micro-micro regression. But why do 
we find these low correlations between the micro and macro LINC and PCM? And 
why are the signs of the relation with productivity reversed? 
We suspect that the explanation of this result lies in the role of small versus large 
firms. On the left-hand side of the equation, we have firm-level mfp-growth. Each 
firm has equal weight in the regressions. On the right-hand side, however, firm-level 
values are aggregated for the macro-indicator, so that large firms play a bigger role 
than small firms. It can be hypothesized that the degree of competition a small firm 
experiences is not the same as that experienced by larger firms. For example, larger 
firms may be primarily competing against each other, while smaller firms operate 
locally or in market niches that are less affected by competition. When linking micro 
to macro in this case there is thus the risk that the productivity growth of small firms 
is being related to a competition indicator that is largely determined by large firms. 
In addition, since we are looking at mfp-growth, we only have continuing firms at 
the left-hand side. On the right-hand side, however, all firms are included in the 
indicator. This may also lead to a distortion, since the productivity growth of con-
tinuing firms is related to the competition as experienced by both continuing firms 
as well as those who have entered or exited. The productivity of continuing firm is 
likely to be higher, while competition is likely to be felt more intensely by exiters. 
So the positive effect of competition may be inflated due to this issue. In annex 5 we 
present some evidence that the influence of large firms and the effect of entry and 
exit play a distorting role when relating micro-level productivity growth to competi-
tion. All in all, our results indicate that one should be cautious with interpreting cor-
relations between micro-level productivity and aggregate measures of competition. 
4. Conclusions and future research 
4.1 Summary of conclusions 
In this paper we have looked at various indicators for competition, and related these 
to multi-factor productivity change. This was done both at the industry- and firm-
level. The analysis was restricted to the manufacturing industry and the period 1995-
2005. The most important conclusions are: 
 Regressions of productivity growth on contemporaneous values for the competi-
tion indicators reveal a negative effect of competition on productivity growth. 
This effect is reversed when a time-lag in the relation between competition and 
productivity is introduced. We find this for both the micro and macro regres-
sions, and this result is robust across most of the indicators. This finding indi-
cates that firms first experience a negative effect of competition, while in subse-
quent periods productivity is increased. A possible explanation is that firms need 
time to adjust, e.g. through investment in R&D or by making necessary adjust-
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ments in the production process, which may first have a disruptive effect but 
lead to productivity gains in later periods; 
 High correlations between similar aggregated micro (based on PS data) and 
macro-indicators (based on the NA) point at consistency of micro and macro 
data. In general, micro indicators follow the pattern of the equivalent macro in-
dicator quite closely. Moreover, as mentioned above, the regression results relat-
ing productivity growth at both aggregation levels to similar competition indica-
tors calculated from micro and macro data are largely consistent; 
 Firm-level regressions by industry do not show many differences in the out-
comes per industry. There is some heterogeneity in the magnitude of the effect 
of competition on productivity growth, but there is almost no heterogeneity in 
the direction or significance of the relationships; 
 Low correlations between micro-level indicators and similar macro indicators 
point at heterogeneity at the firm level, possibly due to differences in small and 
large firms; 
 Relating firm-level productivity growth to industry-level competition indicators 
gives a distorted picture, possibly due to the effect of large firms on the aggre-
gated indicators; 
 We find only weak effects for the effect of international competition on produc-
tivity growth. 
4.2 Limitations and future research 
This study has an explorative nature. We have looked at simple correlations and 
linear regressions. The relation between firm performance and competition is likely 
to be far more complicated than what has been investigated here. In particular, vari-
ous other variables have an impact on productivity growth, thus it would be an inter-
esting exercise to investigate the impact of competition when also controlling for 
these other factors. In addition, other variables may interact with competition, and 
the impact of competition on productivity growth may also run via these interactions 
For instance, Van der Wiel et al. 2008 show that there is a larger catch-up effect of 
firms that are not on the technological frontier when competition is stronger. More-
over, an important part of the effect of competition may run via its effect on R&D. 
The analysis was limited to manufacturing industries to facilitate the comparison of 
micro and macro data and because in general the level of international competition is 
higher for the manufacturing industry than for services. Since the share of the ser-
vices industry in gross domestic product is much larger than the share of the manu-
facturing industry it would also be interesting to investigate the effects of competi-
tion on productivity for services. As services industries are more domestically ori-
ented than manufacturing industries, the set of competition indicators should then be 
limited to a smaller set of indicators excluding export and import measures of com-
petition. Analysing the effects of different indicators of competition on productivity 
for manufacturing and services industries would give a more complete view on these 
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relationships for the total economy. However, measures for the volume change of 
production in the services sector tend to be less well established than for manufac-
turing.  
In terms of econometrics, we controlled for the endogeneity of competition by re-
placing contemporaneous values with lags. Estimation methods like Instrumental 
Variables and the Generalized Method of Moments are alternatives to take account 
of this. The use of these methods could shed light on the issue whether there is truly 
a timing effect or whether the results are driven by an endogeneity problem. 
Although we analyzed a substantial set of indicators related to (relative) profitabil-
ity, market concentration and international competition, we did not include institu-
tional measures of competition. Future research may include institutional measures 
such as (changes in) the liberalization of markets, international trade quota, em-
ployment protection or merger restrictions and patent protection mechanisms. In-
cluding these measures may show to what extent government policies have affected 
market structures and firm performance. An advantage of this type of measures is 
that, since they are imposed from outside the market, they can be treated as exoge-
nous. 
Finally, this study was limited to the use of a single dependent variable, productivity 
change, which is the volume component of the change in profitability. It would also 
be interesting to investigate the effects of competition on the price component of 
profitability, as it is more difficult for companies to raise prices and margins in the 
face of strong competition. Despite the positive effects of competition on productiv-
ity, firms’ profitability may therefore decrease due to lower margins. This would 
also provide evidence for the appropriateness of profit based competition indicators. 
Moreover, the effect of competition on other performance variables as firm size and 
employment are worth investigating. 
 
References 
Aghion, P., N. Bloom, R. Blundell, R. Griffith, and P. Howitt (2005), ‘Competition and 
innovation: an inverted U relationship’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 120(2), pp. 
701-728. 
Balk, B.M. (2008), ‘Measuring productivity change without neoclassical assumptions’, CBS 
working paper. 
Banker, R.D., H.H. Chang and S.K. Majumdar (1996), ’Profitability, productivity and price 
recovery patterns in the U.S. telecommunications industry’, Review of Industrial Organiza-
tion, vol. 11, pp. 1-17. 
Van den Bergen, D., M. van Rooijen-Horsten, M. de Haan, and B.M. Balk (2007) ‘Produc-
tivity measurement at Statistics Netherlands’, Report No. 2007-19-MNR, Statistics Nether-
lands, Voorburg. 
Boone, J. (2000), ‘Competition’, CentER Discussion Paper 2000-104. 
Boone, J., J.C. van Ours and H. van der Wiel (2007), ‘How (not) to measure competition’ 
(Working paper). 
33 
CBS (2008), ‘De Nederlandse Groeirekeningen 2007’, Den Haag. 
Creusen, H., B. Minne, and H. van der Wiel (2006a) ‘Measuring competition in the Nether-
lands - A comparison of indicators over the period 1993-2001’, CPB memorandum nr. 163, 
September 2006. 
Creusen, H., B. Vroomen, H. van der Wiel, and F. Kuypers (2006b), ‘Dutch retail trade on 
the rise? Relation between competition, innovation and productivity’, CPB Document nr. 
137. 
Dixit, A. and R. Pindyck (1994), ‘Investment under uncertainty’, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, New Jersey. 
Felsö, F., M.L. Kok, and J. Theeuwes (2001), ‘Marktwerking en productiviteit’, SEO-rapport 
nr. 598. 
Foster L., J. Haltiwanger and C. Krizan, (2000), ‘Aggregate Productivity Growth : Lessons 
from microeconomic Evidence’ NBER Working Paper No.6803, 2000 
Guadalupe, M. and J. Wulf (2008), ‘The flattening firm and product market competition: the 
effect of trade liberalization’, NBER Working paper No. 14491, issued in november 2008. 
Van Leeuwen, G., M. Polder, M. and E. Veldhuizen (2008), ‘Micro en macro productivi-
tietsontwikkelingen: Een verschillenanalyse voor de chemische industrie’, CBS, Voorburg. 
Lever, M.C.H. and H.R. Nieuwenhuijsen (1998) ‘The impact of competition on productivity 
in Dutch manufacturing’, EIM/CBS strategic study, Zoetermeer. 
Mohnen, P., F.C. Palm, S. Schim van der Loeff, and A. Tiwari (2008), ‘Financial constraints 
and other obstacles: are they a threat to innovation activity?’, De Economist, vol. 156(2), pp. 
201-214. 
Nickell, S.J. (1996), ‘Competition and corporate performance’, Journal of Political Econ-
omy, Volume 104, No.4, p.724-746. 
OECD (2008), ‘Market incentives to innovation: microdata analysis’, OECD proposal to the 
Working Party of Industrial Analysis, DSTI-EAS-IND-WPIA(2008)3, October 2008. 
Power, L. (1998), ‘The missing link: technology, investment, and productivity’, Review of 
Economics and Statistics, vol. 80, pp. 300-313. 
Schumpeter, J.A. (1942), ‘Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy’, Harper and Row, New 
York. 
Van der Wiel, H., H. Creusen, G. van Leeuwen and E. van der Pijll (2008), ‘Cross your bor-
der and look around’, CPB Document nr. 170/CBS Discussion paper 08017.  
 
34 
Annex 1. NACE codes and names of manufacturing industries 
NACE code Industry name 
15+16 Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco 
17+18+19 Manufacture of textile and leather products 
21 Manufacture of paper and paper products 
22 Publishing and printing 
23 Manufacture of petroleum products 
24 Manufacture of chemicals 
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
27 Manufacture of basic metals 
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products 
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
30+31+32+33 Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment 
34+35 Manufacture of transport equipment 
20+26+36+37 Other manufacturing 
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Annex 2a. Comparison of micro and macro labour income ratios 
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Annex 2b. Comparison of micro and macro price cost margins 
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Annex 2c. Comparison of micro and macro export quotes 
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Annex 3a. Development of profit elasticity and Herfindahl index  
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Annex 3b. Development of C4 indicator and import quote 
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Annex 3c. Development of multi-factor productivity 
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Annex 4. Regression results by industry 
 PCM (expected sign: )
level difference lag lag diff
Food products, etc. 30.40*** 111.4*** -22.58*** -30.56*** 
Textile and leather products 29.98*** 125.6*** -24.13*** -28.03*** 
Paper and paper products 22.32*** 110.0*** -19.13*** -19.22*** 
Publishing and printing 27.52*** 112.9*** -17.64*** -21.18***
Chemicals 37.57*** 116.8*** -28.65*** -29.17*** 
Rubber and plastic products 33.01*** 112.9*** -27.36*** -26.43***
Basic metals 11.14*** 102.6*** -20.27*** -27.36*** 
Fabricated metal products 26.01*** 111.4*** -25.33*** -32.20*** 
Machinery and equipment 35.78*** 114.6*** -31.76*** -33.60*** 
Electrical and optical equipment 39.67*** 127.6*** -25.65*** -36.62*** 
Transport equipment 41.11*** 118.3*** -26.31*** -44.53***
Other manufacturing 25.00*** 116.4*** -23.18*** -32.15*** 
LINC (expected sign: +) 
level difference lag lag diff
Food products, etc. -4.12*** -0.62*** 0.10 0.00 
Textile and leather products -7.41*** -5.48*** 2.85*** 1.39***
Paper and paper products -4.83*** -0.01 0.01 -0.01 
Publishing and printing -7.73*** -11.93*** 6.67*** 0.43** 
Chemicals -2.71*** -0.01 -0.08 -0.06 
Rubber and plastic products -5.14*** -0.25*** 0.22*** 0.10*** 
Basic metals -4.20*** -0.50 -0.58 -0.58 
Fabricated metal products -9.63*** -2.75*** 1.62*** 0.42*** 
Machinery and equipment -9.01*** -0.31*** 0.19*** 0.02 
Electrical and optical equipment -9.33*** -2.16*** 1.52*** 0.36** 
Transport equipment -8.85*** -3.57*** 2.18*** 0.28 
Other manufacturing -6.12*** -0.06** 0.03 -0.01 
EXPQ (expected sign: +) 
level difference lag lag diff
Food products, etc. -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 1.55 
Textile and leather products -0.37 -1.17 -0.06 2.10 
Paper and paper products -0.31 -0.98 0.15 0.48 
Publishing and printing -0.97 -0.78 -0.65 -0.68 
Chemicals -0.83 -0.49 -0.32 3.47*** 
Rubber and plastic products -0.30 0.02 0.06 -1.80 
Basic metals -0.90 -3.24 -0.06 -2.24 
Fabricated metal products 0.23 -0.25 0.58 0.24 
Machinery and equipment -0.37 -0.76 -0.14 0.35 
Electrical and optical equipment -0.18 -1.02 -0.06 3.34*
Transport equipment 0.03 -0.89 0.79 3.94*** 
Other manufacturing -0.45 -0.02 -0.26 1.05 
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Annex 5. Effect of large firms and entry/exit on competition indicators 
To investigate the possibly distorting effect of large firms and entry/exit on the re-
sults for the relation between micro-level productivity and macro competition indi-
cators, we have looked at alternative calculations for the indicators. Since we are 
investigating the effect of particular firms, we will look at industry level indicators 
calculated from the micro data. For the PCM, we look at a version which is not 
weighted by market share, as well as one only based on continuing (i.e. ‘panel’) 
firms (and both).18 For the LINC, we cancel the influence of larger firms by taking 
an unweighted average of the LINC by firm, again also with/without non-panel 
firms.19 Table A5.1 reports the results for the various regressions based on the alter-
native calculations.  
We see that the calculation based on the unweighted definitions still lead to the op-
posite sign as the micro-micro regressions. The panel based definition, however, 
leads to a reversal of the sign of the PCM. Moreover, basing the calculation on both 
panel firms and using no weights leads to a change of sign for both the PCM and 
LINC. Although insignificant, this can be seen as an indication that the aggregate 
indicators are indeed contaminated by a minority of large firms and by en-
trants/exiters, whose exposure or sensitiveness to competition is not representative 
for other firms within the same industry. In fact, as argued in the main text, the de-
gree of competition they experience may be inversely related to that experienced by 
other firms. If we neutralize the influence of these firms, the effects are more in line 
with what we find above. 
 
Table A5.1. Estimation results for productivity-competition relation with alternative calcula-
tions for PCM and LINC. 
 PCM  (expected sign: )
LINC 
(expected sign: +) 
definition coefficient p-value coefficient p-value 
micro (aggregated) -5.828 0.103 2.660 0.023 
unweighted -11.925 0.008 0.478 0.854 
panel 1.138 0.782 2.959 0.009 
panel and unweighted 1.843 0.818 -1.740 0.517 
Nb. Dependent variable is mfp growth at the firm level. 
 
A further possible investigation of this interpretation is the breakdown of the results 
by size class. We do this by considering regression by size class, and by calculating 
the PCM and the LINC separately for each size class. Table A5.2 gives the results. 
In the left-hand panel, the results of the regression by size class are reported. The 
 
18 We reserve the classification ‘panel firms’ for firms that are present in the data in year t
and t1.  
19 Note that this is different from the original calculation of the indicator, where first sums 
are taken separately for the numerator and denominator of the LINC. 
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original definitions of the PCM and LINC are used. We see that it are primarily the 
lower size classes (6 or lower) that show a sign opposite to the micro-micro regres-
sion. This is true for both the PCM and the LINC. These coefficients are also rela-
tively large in magnitude and have generally lower p-values. Thus, the aggregated 
indicators give the opposite sign as the micro-indicators primarily for the smaller 
firms, whereas the sign for the larger firms is in line with the micro regressions. 
Although mostly not or only marginally significant, these results again indicate that 
the opposite signs for the micro and micro-macro regressions are caused by the fact 
that the aggregated indicators are largely determined by the larger firms. This leads 
to the opposite sign for the smaller firms as their productivity is being related to the 
degree of competition experienced by larger firms, which may in fact be inversely 
related to the competition experienced by smaller firms. 
In the right-hand panel, we try to account for the influence of large firms by calcu-
lating the PCM and LINC separately for size classes (in addition to by industry and 
year). We see that in this case most size classes have the same sign as in the micro 
regression (although again sometimes not or only marginally significant). Thus, 
when we attempt to correct the indicators for the effect of the larger firms, the same 
signs as in the micro regressions are found. Again this is consistent with the idea that 
opposite signs to the micro-micro regressions arise because of the influence of large 
firms on the aggregated indicators. 
Although we cannot completely single out the effect of large firms, we interpret the 
whole of these sensitivity checks as evidence that the macro-indicators mainly re-
flect competition for the large firms. Because the micro data consists mainly of 
smaller firms, using the aggregated indicators in a micro-regression gives distorted 
results. In addition, the indicators are further influenced by entering and exiting 
firms, which may experience other degrees of competition as continuing firms. This 
conclusion is non-trivial, because competition is often seen as an industry-level phe-
nomenon and one might therefore be tempted to link industry-level competition 
measures to micro data. Our findings suggest caution with the use of these measures. 
Note that although the PE is an industry-level indicator, it does not suffer this draw-
back, since in principle each firm has the same weight in the underlying regression 
carried out to determine the PE. 
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Table A5.2. Estimation results productivity-competition relationship by size class.
industry × year industry × year × size class
PCM () LINC (+) PCM () LINC (+)
size
class
# empl. coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value
1 1 -108.401 0.143 17.531 0.320 -9.688 0.704 1.981 0.872
2 2-4 24.598 0.544 -1.004 0.919 -8.107 0.688 -9.109 0.214
3 5-9 -63.424 0.021 8.810 0.164 31.613 0.112 -8.118 0.103
4 10-19 -5.206 0.739 7.012 0.065 -1.664 0.908 -2.630 0.305
5 20-49 5.779 0.499 1.574 0.441 46.392 0.001 -2.955 0.259
6 50-99 -13.289 0.154 2.858 0.195 8.936 0.477 -4.709 0.196
7 100-199 9.313 0.376 -2.468 0.317 48.999 0.000 -4.097 0.115
8 200-499 9.303 0.406 -1.027 0.704 42.921 0.000 -3.084 0.225
9 > 499 -1.812 0.915 2.023 0.656 34.350 0.007 -1.462 0.484
Dependent variable is mfp growth at the firm level.
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Annex 6. Derivation of KLEMS-Y variables from the PS-data 
At the micro-level, data are sourced from the Production Statistics (PS). This annex 
describes how the KLEMS-Y are derived, following Van Leeuwen et al. (2008). 
 
Y production value 
K = CK + B1 + KB2  KY2 costs of capital 
L = CL  Y1 + LB2  LY2 costs of labour 
E = CE + EB2  EY2 costs of energy use 
M = CM + MB2  MY2 costs of material 
S = CS + sB2  sY2 costs of services 
 
where  
 C = CK + CL + CE + CM + CS total factor costs  
 (without taxes and subsidies) 
 k = Ck/C weight of factor k  {KLEMS}
Tables A6.1 and A6.2 show how the variables are derived from the PS data. 
 
Table A6.1 Derivation of taxes and subsidies. 
variable  IMPECT variable description 
other taxes on production Y1 = SUBSIDI140000 wage subsidies 
other subsidies Y2 = SUBSIDI100000 total of restitution and subsidies received 
  SUBSIDI140000 wage subsidies 
 
taxes on capital B1 = BEDRLST342400 road tax 
 + BEDRLST343420 property tax 
 
other taxes B2 = BEDRLST343410 polution tax 
 BEDRLST349600 taxes on products 
46 
Table A6.2 Derivation of output and factor costs. 
variabele KLEMS-Y IMPECT code description 
output large firms   
Y = VERKOOP211000 revenue main economic activity 
 + VOORRAD100900 changes in inventory 
 + VERKOPH212000 revenue from trade and other activities 
  INKWRDE110000 purchase value of goods intended for resale 
 + OPBRENG112000 revenue from second personnel 
 + ONTVANG100000 received insurance payments from  
 + INVESTN130000 own-account development of investments 
 + OPBRENG110000 other revenue 
 
small firms   
Y = VERKOOP211000 revenue main economic activity 
 + VERKOPH212000 revenue from trade and other activities 
  INKWRDE110000 purchase value of goods intended for resale 
 + OPBRENG100000 other revenue 
 
capital CK = AFSCHRG110000 depreciation 
 + FINREST120000 rental payments 
 
labour CL = LOONSOM100000 total labour costs 
 
energy CE = BEDRLST341000 total costs of energy use 
 
material large firms   
CM = INKWRDE120000 purchase value of materials and supplies 
 + INKWRDE131000 purchase value other material 
 + INKWRDE132000 contract work 
 + INKWRDE133000 other purchase value 
 
small firms   
CM = INKWRDE100000 total purchase value of revenue 
  INKWRDE110000 total purchase value of goods intended for resale 
services large firms   
CS = BEDRLST342000 total costs of vehicles 
  BEDRLST342400 road tax 
 + BEDRLST343000 total accommodation costs 
  BEDRLST343410 pollution taxes 
  BEDRLST343420 property taxes 
 + BEDRLST345000 total other labour costs 
 + BEDRLST346000 total sales costs 
 + BEDRLST347000 communication costs 
 + BEDRLST348000 total costs of services by third parties  
 + BEDRLST349000 total other costs 
  BEDRLST349600 other cost price raising taxes 
 
small firms   
CS = BEDRLST342000 total costs of vehicles 
 + BEDRLST343000 total accommodation costs 
 + BEDRLST345000 total other labour costs 
 + BEDRLST346000 total sales costs 
 + BEDRLST347000 communication costs 
 + BEDRLST348000 total costs of services by third parties 
 + BEDRLST349000 total other costs 
